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Abstract: 
 
RasGas is operating many centrifugal compressors from different major OEM’s. Of 
an OEM product-line, twenty-four (24) centrifugal compressors with a total rated 
power of roughly ~ 900 Mega-watt are in operation, out of which 16 are barrel type 
(BCL). 
 
Driven by an end-cover or Head-Flange (HF) O-ring failure during early months of 
operation,  indicated via gas leak in to atmosphere, a series of actions were taken 
due to serious uncertainties of the HF O-rings reliability, for both the units already in 
operations and the ones under Pre-Mechanical Completion.  
 
Actions included materials properties, tests data, selection (e.g. spliced versus single 
piece) and manufacturing processes and O-ring makers and supplier’s traceability. A 
comprehensive Risk Assessment led by Project Team and supported by EM experts 
was carried-out to determine whether HF O-rings already installed in similar unit 
shall be replaced right away prior to putting it in to full operation.  
 
Test schedule to accept or reject assembled HF at site was defined. Small 
modifications for continues monitoring of the HF O-rings during operation was also 
established. 
 
This Case Study is intended to share some lessons of technical aspects reviewed 
including selection processes. Site challenges to replace the HF O-rings for such 
barrel type centrifugal compressors and the site test schedule are also covered.  
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Objective 
 
LL sharing from HF O-rings failures on large 
size barrel-type centrifugal compressors.  
 
 Best practices – vent monitoring & recovery 
system, leak test procedures 
 Single-piece mould O-rings, factory and/or site 
leak tests at commissioning phase, post 
intervention 
 Precautions: selection, manufacturing records, 
preservations 
Problem description 
During commissioning of mega LNG trains in 2009, 
gas leak from barrel end-wall was experienced during 
pressurization process. This problem was also 
noticed on existing compressors which were in 
operation for about 5 years. 
Site view:  compressors  driven by F6B and F9E 
Arrangements 
16 BCL units  
• BCL 803 HF O-rings failure 
during commissioning 
• BCL 806  leakage after ~5  years 
operation, 35 % LEL at split line, 
0.0 at  ~ 0.5 m. 
• BCL 806 leakage after ~ 5 years 
• 2BCL1006 upgrades, opportunity 
Field Challenges 
• Time  
• Large size, heavy components and assemblies 
• Tooling for HF removal 
• Space  
• Risks associated during removals / installations HP 
couplings, bearings and seals, shear and shim rings 
Centrifugal Compressor’s head-flange 
and the O-rings 
Typical BCL compressor diagram 
Head-flange / end-cover O-rings, 
used earlier was split design.  
Compressor bundle with 
O-ring. 
Failure analyses and techniques (failed LGR 
machine O-rings) 
 
• Defective O-ring material: specified FKM materials would 
have been suitable for the duty specified. 
• Spliced O-rings: A leak from the casing head flange on the 
drive end (discharge end) of the T6 Lean Gas  Re- 
compressor (LGR) was found in June 2009 during the duty 
runs (dynamic test runs). Upon inspection, technicians 
found the two O-rings were defective. The outer O-ring 
had two splice joints that had failed; the inner O-ring had 
one spliced butt joint that had failed and a mechanical tear. 
Both O-rings had surface imperfections. 
• O-ring groove geometry: found as per design. However to 
meet new material, cord dimension was increased. 
 
 
Failure analyses: spare O-rings condition in 
warehouse, stored for few years 
• Preservation condition acceptable, however, defects 
(cracks) on joints were visible. 
• Spare O-rings presented evidence of cracks without any 
bending and failed by bending @ the bonded joint.  
• No evidence of vulcanization except adhesion.   
 
Shop test was at 66.8 bar G 
/ 30-min / with N2 per API 
617.  No leaks observed. 
Spliced O-ring might pass 
30-min leak check, but fail 
once in service at operating 
temperature (100+C) and 
pressure pulsations. 
 
 
Failure analysis and techniques (failed LGR 
machine O-rings) 
• Explosive decompression : Visual inspection of inboard 
O-ring indicated minor blistering phenomenon revealing 
explosive decompression. FKM75 would have resisted to 
ED provided compliance with the specs. 
• O-ring extrusion : Cross section and dimensions 
verification did not reveal any extrusion. 
• Fracture surface inspection.  
• Shore A hardness test : Result is 68 against requirement 
of 75. 
• Density test : Result is 1.85 gm/cm3 as per specification. 
 
 
 
 
Failure analysis and techniques (failed LGR 
machine O-rings) 
 
• Joint resistance Test:  Rupture at 35 kgf 
and 55 kgf for NDE side O Rings and that 
is 18 and 35 % of specified base material 
strengths. 
• Wire Resistance test : failure produced 
with 120 kgf that is 61 % of expected 
strength. 
• FTIR analysis : Sample spectrum 
compared with library and material 
confirmed to be Fluoroelastomer (FKM or 
Viton). 
Failure analysis and techniques (failed LGR 
machine O rings.) 
• Joint of  was not obtained from from vulcanizing 
process, but more of a gluing process 
• Poor quality of the joint glue, irregular interface and the 
lower strenght materials all combine to make a joint that 
will not last many pressure cycles.  During normal 
operation, process gas enters the gaps in the joint.  
When the compressor shuts down, the pressure in the 
joint gaps pushes the joint apart. 
• Thermo gravimetric analysis (TGA):  Ashes mainly 
consists of Magnesium and that is representing filler 
(MgO).  Viton is about 85 % and Ash 15%, weight loss 
temperature is 615 Deg C. 
• O-rings for MR and N2 units: found to be Viton 90 and better 
splicing / vulcanizing techniques.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure analysis and techniques (failed LGR 
machine O-rings ) 
 
• The gas from the 
recovery system 
routed directly to flare 
line.  
 
• Remote monitoring 
provided for cavity 
pressure (space 
between two O- 
rings). 
Best practice : Head Flange Vent Recovery 
System to contain leak 
• Connect a source of nitrogen (e.g. line or bottles). 
 
• Test loop shall also include: pressure control valve 
(PCV), manual isolation valve, needle valve 
PCV 
Manual 
isolation 
valve 
Vent 
Needle 
valve 
N2 
Acceptance Criteria : 
 
Pressure indication can be 
helpful, but not easy to 
determine acceptance criteria.  
 
APl617 requirement states "... 
no bubble formation is 
observed". 
Best practice: End wall O ring Leak Test 
Procedure 
 • Sprinkle compressor end-cover with foam. 
• Close needle valve and leave open manual isolation 
valve. Set PCV at the required pressure and start 
pressurizing the cavity. Test pressure shall be 
compressor normal discharge pressure or, in case this 
is higher than nitrogen external source, maximum 
pressure available. 
• Start searching for potential formation of bubbles on 
foam, evidence of leakage. After 15 minutes close 
manual isolation valve. 
• Slowly open needle valve and gradually vent nitrogen. 
• Repeat cycle 2 times for a total of 3 test cycles and for 
each compressor side (suction and discharge). 
 
Best Practice:  End wall O ring Leak Test 
Procedure  
Solution 
Property Old design, NGL5 New Design 
O ring dia, wire 
diameter 
1630 mm and 14 mm 1660 mm and 15 mm 
Generic Material, PPE 
grade  
FKM, V75J FKM, V91J 
Hardness 0 IRHD Shore 75 Shore 90 
Min Max Temp 0C -15 / +200 -17 / 225 
Tensile strength 17.4 MPa 24 MPa 
Elongation at break % 300 210 
Manufacturing With joints Single Mould 
Typical comparison of Old O-ring and New O-ring materials 
• Material selection process to be improved.  Detailed 
purchase specifications with QA/QC checks issued. 
Single mold O-rings are preferred. 
 
• Usage of 90 durometer O-rings for better Explosive 
decompression resistance. 
 
• Sub-vendor product records to ensure traceability 
 
• Proper storage in temperature controlled environment 
and with proper packaging (see ‘guidance’ @ last page) 
 
• Installation of Leak Monitoring and Recovery system to 
be specified from project stage. Also Leak test to be 
performed during start ups for O ring health check. 
Recommendations 
• O-ring materials shall be 
compatible with all specified 
services and to ensure they 
are not prone to and will not 
be damaged upon rapid 
depressurization (explosive 
decompression). 
 
• Installation of gas detectors 
near centre line of 
compressor. 
 
Recommendations 
• Stored between 15 and 25°C, away from direct 
sunlight/ultra-violet light, preferably in black bags. 
• Protected from all sources of ionizing radiation likely to 
cause damage to the products 
• Storage rooms should not contain any equipment that is 
capable of generating Ozone. 
• Humidity should be less than 70%. 
• Elastomer seals should be stored free from tensions or 
compressive stresses or other causes of deformation 
• The seals should not be stored with or in contact with other 
rubber seals, liquids etc. 
• Storage should comply with BS ISO 2230:2002 ‘Rubber 
products - Guidelines for storage’ 
Recommendation:  O-ring storage guidance 
